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Heterodox economics:  
A common challenge to mainstream economics? 
Sheila Dow 
1. Introduction 
Heterodox economics has been going through a period of change. The most noticeable 
change has been the drawing together of heterodox economists using different 
approaches into the larger category of ‘heterodox economics’. This has had a series of 
positive outcomes: notably a growing confidence in heterodox economics, and an 
increasing interchange of ideas among those taking different heterodox approaches. The 
increasing duality that this has created, between orthodox and heterodox economics, has 
had both positive and negative outcomes: a growing cohesion among those seeking to 
put forward a convincing alternative to orthodox economics, on the one hand, but the 
temptation to slip into a dualistic mode of thought which is more characteristic of the 
orthodoxy, on the other hand. While orthodox economics has been criticized for its 
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exclusivity, as being the ‘right’ approach so that all others are ‘wrong’, there is a danger 
that heterodox economics might fall into the same habit. 
At the same time, orthodox economics has also been undergoing a period of change. 
In the 1980s it was reasonable to characterize mainstream economics as unified around 
the commitment to building up a general equilibrium theoretical system (see Weintraub 
1985). But there has been increasing evidence of fragmentation, with the development 
of such apparently diverse research programmes as game theory, experimental 
economics, evolutionary economics, behavioural economics, complexity economics, 
and so on (Davis forthcoming). While many heterodox economists (such as Lawson 
1997, 2003) continue to focus on the common features of orthodox economics, 
orthodox economists themselves (such as Pencavel 1991) tend to focus on its diversity.  
A particular question posed by these developments is whether the different schools 
of thought in heterodox economics continue to have a useful role to play, and what that 
role is. It is the purpose of this paper to address this question. We approach the question 
in a range of ways, and at a range of levels. (This is an example of a pluralist 
methodology, something which we will consider explicitly during the discussion.) At 
the most general level, we can consider schools of thought quite apart from questions of 
orthodoxy and heterodoxy; is it a good way for promoting the development of 
knowledge for knowledge communities and/or ideas to be segmented into schools of 
thought? In this discussion we bear in mind the importance of issues of meaning; what 
are the implications of different schools of thought employing different meanings? And, 
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focusing on the orthodoxy/heterodoxy divide, which is the more effective strategy for 
promoting heterodox ideas – emphasising or de-emphasising differences within 
heterodoxy?  
Much of the discussion of the current state of economics has contrasted it with the 
fierce debates between schools of thought in the 1970s (Colander 2000, Goodwin 2000, 
Pencavel 1991). The implication has been drawn that economics has moved on from 
this, regrettable, kind of division. Here already we see issues of meaning arise – perhaps 
schools of thought are understood differently now – or indeed differently, depending on 
school of thought? We start therefore by considering a range of traditional views about 
schools of thought. We then proceed to consider more recent views of schools of 
thought. Some of these issues have been discussed in more detail elsewhere (Dow 
forthcoming). The particular contribution of this paper is to suggest a diagrammatic 
framework for depicting these different understandings of schools of thought. The case 
is made that thinking of heterodox economics in terms of schools of thought can be 
enabling rather than constraining. This argument draws on the argument developed 
more fully elsewhere (Dow 2004) for structured pluralism. We conclude by considering 
the strategic issues raised for heterodox economics. 
2. Open and closed systems 
In considering how schools of thought have been understood, we will use the concepts 
of open and closed systems. These concepts can be applied to the different levels of 
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social systems, theoretical systems and systems of thought, and there are connections 
between the levels (Dow 2001). (Indeed it is the critical realist argument that open 
social systems require open theoretical systems and open systems of thought; see 
Lawson 1997, 2003.) But our primary focus here is on systems (or schools) of thought. 
How we understand the concepts of open and closed systems themselves is a matter for 
current discussion. For the purposes of this paper we employ the meaning set out in 
Chick/Dow (2005), which differs, for example, from the critical realist meaning. We 
define openness and closure as following from a range of conditions. A closed system 
has fixed, well-defined boundaries, and all variables within the system, and the structure 
of their interrelations, are identified, and their values either knowable or random. (An 
open model is a closed system, since the exogenous variables are well-defined and 
either known or random.)  
Open systems are those in which any of these closed-system conditions is not met. 
There is a range of possibilities therefore for open systems, since all it takes is for one 
element of the system to be unknowable, one boundary not to be fixed, one interrelation 
to be indeterminate (and non-random). So open systems are not the dual of closed 
systems, but rather they are not-closed systems. The conditions for closed systems are 
very strict. Mearman (2005) has argued that it is more helpful to think in terms of poles 
than duals, so that we can think of systems as being more or less close to the extreme 
closed end of the spectrum. For the purposes of the following argument, however, we 
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will simplify by referring to closed and open systems, where a closed system is 
understood to be ‘towards the polar extreme of strict closed systems’.  
3. ‘Old’ views on schools of thought 
3.1 The orthodox economics perspective 
Let us consider first how schools of thought were understood in the 1980s, starting with 
the perspective of orthodox economics. The most common example given of differences 
between schools of thought is the Monetarist-Keynesian debate which was conducted in 
terms of the IS-LM framework. Differences in how the economy functioned were 
reduced to debates about the relative slopes of the IS and LM curves. To the extent that 
the differences were not purely technical, they were seen as ideological.  
The term ‘ideological’ in the orthodox literature was used always to disparage. It 
referred to the import of political values into scientific debate. Since it was taken for 
granted that science in general, and economics in particular, should be value-free, 
political values had no place. Introductory textbooks habitually were introduced with a 
discussion of the distinction between positive and normative economics. The economist 
was to demonstrate the consequences of different policy stances in a positive manner, 
but it was for the politician to choose between them.  
Within orthodox economics, there were different theoretical approaches, as theory 
moved beyond general equilibrium theory, dealing in different ways with the difficulties 
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encountered with specifying the microfoundations of macroeconomics. Thus Phelps 
(1990) could identify seven different theoretical approaches to macroeconomics, all 
within orthodox economics; indeed he referred to them as schools of thought. But these 
approaches all held in common the key characteristics of orthodox economics: rational, 
atomistic agents with certainty-equivalent knowledge (or some well-defined constraint 
on full knowledge), a fixed structure of economic relations which were knowable or 
random, and could thus be expressed mathematically, and clearly defined exogenous 
variables which produced random shocks. As a positive discipline, economics itself was 
value-free; disputes in principle could be tested against objective facts. In other words, 
positive economics (which was understood as coterminous with orthodox economics, 
and indeed with economics as a whole) was a closed system.  
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Figure 1: ‘Old’ heterodox view of economics  
This closed system is illustrated in Figure 1 by a solid line defining the discipline. 
Within economics, the different theories (New Classical theory, New Keynesian theory, 
etc.) are illustrated as falling within the well-defined boundary of economics. But they 
are shown with hatched boundaries, to capture the fact that, as evolving systems within 
the closed system of economics, they are open systems. Since the Monetarist-Keynesian 
debates were classified as ideological, they fell outside economics proper, belonging 
rather to normative analysis. The thick closed boundaries illustrate the fixity with which 
these normative values were associated, and the ferocity with which they were 
defended. While positive economics was well-defined as orthodox economics, it was 
recognized that there were other schools of thought beyond Monetarism and 
Keynesianism. Kantor (1979) for example recognized the roots of the rational 
expectations revolution in Austrian economics. So there was a perception of interplay 
between ideas developed within an ideological framework and economics-proper 
(illustrated by the two-way arrows). The most obvious exception was Marxism, which 
was understood as an ideological system which operated quite independently of 
economics-proper, so no connecting arrows are shown. 
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3.2 The heterodox economics perspective 
This period is referred to by Pencavel (1991) as tyrannical. The implication is that there 
was excessive criticism, from an ideological perspective. He contrasts this with what he 
identifies by the 1990s as a greater openness of debate, implicitly conducted within the 
confines of economics-proper. The period is also often associated with the ideas of 
Thomas Kuhn, which seemed to have removed the grounds for criticism from an agreed 
set of principles, exchanging it for an ‘anything goes’ framework. If we think of schools 
of thought as paradigms, then each has its own set of principles, and therefore any 
debate across schools of thought is a debate at cross-purposes. These ideas were 
embraced by heterodox economists as legitimising their alternative paradigms, taking 
them outside the ambit of criticism on the basis of the principles of orthodox economics 
(as making insufficient use of mathematical formalism, for example).  
From a heterodox perspective, there was no sharp divide between positive and 
normative economics. Rather, as Myrdal (1953) argued, ideology, in the sense of 
values, was embedded in economic thought. This is captured in the range of levels at 
which Kuhn’s paradigms are defined. The distinction then between orthodox and 
heterodox economics was not, as orthodox economists suggested, the distinction 
between positive economics and ideology, but rather a distinction between paradigms. 
Each paradigm was defined by its understanding of the real world (its ontology), its 
methodological principles and the theories which these supported. It was also defined 
by the meanings attached to terms; ‘rational’ for example was taken to mean something 
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very different in Post Keynesian economics from what it meant in orthodox economics. 
But there was an element of commonality between the different heterodox schools of 
thought in that they had all adopted a methodology which, while distinctive, in each 
case was differentiated from the closed-system methodology of orthodox economics 
(Dow 1985). 
Figure 2: ‘Old’ heterodox view of Economics 
This view of the discipline is shown in Figure 2. Orthodox economics is more explicitly 
seen as a closed system, its boundary being marked by a heavy solid line; the second, 
lighter, boundary line represents the particularity of meanings associated with that 
boundary. The radii represent the centrality of the rationality axioms to orthodox 
economics. But within the resulting structure, there were different theories associated 
with different assumptions about constraints within the over-arching general 
equilibrium framework (for example, constraints on expectations formation). Since 
these theories were continually evolving, as assumptions were revised, they are shown 
with hatched boundaries. 
The different heterodox schools of thought (represented here by four examples) are 
shown by a light solid line, with a second line to capture particularity of meaning. The 
boundary is solid, implying only limited differentiation from the closed-system 
approach of orthodox economics. Indeed in the 1980s there was only limited awareness 
among heterodox economists of the closed-system/open-system distinction. Further, 
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schools of thought were regarded (at least in principle) as reasonably well-defined. The 
objections to such definition referred more to the fact that individuals did not 
necessarily fit these definitions than that schools of thought could not be understood in 
terms of a well-defined ‘representative individual’. Indeed, the schools illustrated here 
are shown as overlapping, to reflect the cross-fertilisation of ideas facilitated by 
individual economists whose thought straddled different schools of thought (like 
Shackle, who was in the interface between Post Keynesian economics and Austrian 
economics). Some overlap is also shown with orthodox economics (Hicks being an 
example of an orthodox economist who nevertheless interacted with Post Keynesian 
economics). Again, however, no direct connection is shown between Marxian 
economics and orthodox economics.i Within each school of thought, a range of evolving 
theories is illustrated by hatched lines. But the heterodox schools of thought do not have 
an axiomatic structure as is shown for orthodox economics. 
While we have seen that orthodox economists associated the 1980s with excessive 
(and inappropriately ideological) criticism, some heterodox economists (such as 
Fullbrook 2003) have associated it with insufficient criticism. At the time, Kuhn’s 
framework had been seen as supportive of the whole notion of a range of paradigms 
offered as alternatives to the dominant, orthodox paradigm. But the suggestion now is 
that Kuhn’s framework had been even more influential in protecting orthodox 
economics from criticism. Just as orthodox principles had only limited purview as far as 
heterodox economics was concerned, so the principles of heterodox economics were 
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seen only to apply to heterodox economics. This outcome was reinforced by the 
emergence of postmodernism, and constructivism more generally, which seemed to 
remove all grounds for criticism altogether. This development was to change the way in 
which schools of thought were understood. 
4. ‘New’ views on schools of thought 
4.1 The orthodox economics perspective 
The view of schools of thought in orthodox economics is coloured by the growing 
theoretical plurality we noted in the Introduction. The perception of increasing 
fragmentation in orthodox economics has been welcomed (eg. by Pencavel 1991, 
Colander 2000, and Goodwin 2000) as an opening-up of the discipline in contrast to the 
ideological divides of the previous decades. These different theoretical approaches 
might be called schools of thought, but they were to be differentiated from schools of 
thought defined by ideology; these new differences were well within the boundaries of 
‘economics-proper’.  
Economics is still seen as well-defined, and there is a consensus that this definition is 
at the level of method. The same commentators have noted that the increasing plurality 
of theories has arisen alongside an increasing monism in terms of the method of 
mathematical formalism. Thus economics is understood to be coterminous with 
orthodox economics. Since heterodox economics shares the view that economics should 
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not be defined in this way, it is understood as ‘non-economics’. Thus, while debate 
occurred between orthodox and heterodox economics in the 1980s (even if it was 
frowned upon as being ideological), the connection is now broken. 
Figure 3: ‘New’ orthodox view of economics 
Figure 3 illustrates this perspective. Economics as such is a well-defined (closed) 
system, defined by method. Anything which does not conform methodologically is 
treated as non-economics, illustrated by a separate ellipse, with dotted boundary (since 
it is not well-defined other than in not employing the approved ‘economic’ method. 
There is a reluctance to use the term ‘heterodox’ (see eg Goodwin 2000), in that all 
economic discourse is now perceived to occur within the ‘economics’ ellipse. What 
would once have been heterodox is now seen as just part of the general fragmentation – 
as long as it employs the appropriate methodology. Anything else by definition falls 
outside economics. The different theories within economics, as evolving entities, are 
shown by hatched boundaries. Experimental economics is shown right at the boundary 
of economics to illustrate its interdisciplinary nature. But experimental economics, 
rather than psychology, is defined still in terms of method. 
The different approaches within orthodox economics also are not seen as well-
defined because of the influence of constructivism, which has affected orthodox 
economics as much as, if not more than, heterodox economics. Weintraub’s (1999) 
account of twentieth-century economics is a good example of constructivism at work. 
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He shows how different histories may be written from different perspectives; there is no 
longer any sense that it is possible to identify a ‘true’ history. Similarly, there is no 
scope for writing a ‘true’ account of modern economics.  
The heterodox economics perspective 
4.2.1 Pure pluralism 
Constructivism has had a more explicit role in the development of heterodox thought. 
Indeed the launch pad for constructivism in the form of postmodernism was a critique 
of positivist orthodox methodology. Kuhn’s framework provided the basis for a critique 
of any attempt to establish universal appraisal criteria as inevitably being paradigm-
bound. But postmodernists extended the critique to any attempt to establish even 
paradigm-bound appraisal criteria, a position encapsulated in their embracing of the 
term ‘nihilism’ (see for example Amariglio/Ruccio 1995). There is no role therefore for 
methodology as a prescriptive, rather than descriptive, exercise. Further, our 
understanding of the real world is subjective; it is not even individualistic, since the self 
itself is fragmented (Amariglio 1988). There is therefore no scope for identifying 
paradigms defined by shared understandings of the real world, and shared 
methodologies.  
This postmodern reluctance to think in terms of schools of thought, and indeed of the 
ontologies and methodological principles which define them, is shared by the rhetoric 
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approach pioneered in modern economics by McCloskey (1986, 1994). According to 
this form of constructivism, knowledge progresses by means of good conversation. 
Anything which is thought to impede conversation, like identification with one school 
of thought or another, or discussion of methodological principles, is to be avoided. 
McCloskey is not a heterodox economist, and indeed her work arguably has had greater 
impact on the orthodox reluctance to address methodological issues. Nevertheless she is 
often cited by heterodox economists (such as Garnett, forthcoming), particularly in 
support of pluralism within heterodox economics.  
While Garnett still sees a role for schools of thought in economics, others who accept 
constructivist arguments do not. On the one hand, postmodernists see heterodox 
economics as an open system, with ill-defined boundaries, and including a range of 
approaches, each with ill-defined boundaries. Problems of meaning are seen as 
endemic, and contribute significantly to the difficulties with defining boundaries. To 
define boundaries, ie to define schools of thought, requires shared meaning and shared 
methodological principles, which are ruled out by nihilism. This is illustrated in Figure 
4 by the hatched boundary for heterodox economics and for the approaches within it. 
Orthodox economics remains well-defined by its mathematical formalist methodology 
and the consequences for the axiomatic structure, and content, of theory. 
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Figure 4: ‘New’ heterodox view of economics: Unstructured pluralism/dualism 
Somewhat curiously, the same diagrams may be used to represent critical realism, even 
though, far from de-emphasising methodology, critical realists focus on it. The 
constructivist argument is shared, that there is no basis for demonstrable truth. Further, 
the difference between orthodox economics and heterodox economics is that the former 
takes a closed-system approach to knowledge while the latter takes an open-system 
approach. Schools of thought are given a role in critical realism. But the emphasis is on 
the over-arching open system of heterodox economics, and thus the shared basis for 
methodological principles. Schools of thought are differentiated merely by their 
‘ontological commitments’, by which is meant their focus of attention within a shared 
ontology. The distinctions between schools of thought are thus secondary to their shared 
philosophical principles, and may thus be shown as if they were simply different 
theories within a single approach, as in Figure 4. 
4.2.2 Structured pluralism 
While we have been talking of the constructivist approach to schools of thought as a 
‘new’ view, it could be said in fact to be perpetuating the old view of schools of thought 
as being rigidly defined, providing the basis for destructive, rather than constructive 
debate. Or, as in Lawson’s view, differences between heterodox schools of thought may 
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be seen as relatively insignificant, and thus the ‘old’ view of schools of thought was 
overplayed. 
But, by considering further the concept of pluralism, we can see a continuing, 
constructive, role for schools of thought in heterodox economics. The arguments for 
pluralism have been discussed ever since Caldwell (1982) first proposed it as the way 
forward, beyond positivism. The Salanti and Screpanti (1997) volume provides a good 
range of perspectives, with the editors emphasising both the ethical arguments for 
openness to a range of approaches as well as the methodological arguments. But there 
has been less discussion about what pluralism would actually consist of, leaving the 
impression that what is intended is the pure pluralism discussed above. Caldwell has 
however always emphasized the role of criticism (see eg Caldwell 1986), which 
suggests limits to pure pluralism, or ‘anything goes’. The difficulty is the grounds on 
which criticism is to be made. 
An answer lies in the study of science, or indeed of a social system like the economy. 
Pure pluralism is unworkable in practice. Unless there is some shared understanding of 
reality, some shared meaning of terms, and some shared view about the parameters for 
argument, then communication cannot take place. There would be no such thing as 
science. In practise, knowledge communities function by means of some sharing of 
ontology, meaning and means of argument. There is no need for this sharing to be 
perfect, and even less for it to be universal. (And we know that there is no basis for any 
universal standard for knowledge.) What this implies is, rather than pure pluralism, a 
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structured pluralism; rather than an infinite range of approaches to knowledge, a 
discrete number of knowledge communities (or schools of thought). Further, given the 
need for open systems of knowledge to address an open-system reality, this structure 
itself would be open (and thus provisional), with overlap between communities, shifting 
meanings and methodologies as reality and ideas evolve. 
While it has been argued that, for functionality, such communities must form for any 
shared knowledge to develop, we can see further that identifying these communities can 
play a constructive part. Classifying economics as a set of communities according to 
ontology, meanings and methodologies helps us to understand each other better, 
communicate better (albeit imperfectly) and benefit from each other’s ideas, which can 
then be adapted to different frameworks. Perhaps this argument is best put by means of 
an anthropological analogy. When travelling to visit a new country, we benefit most 
(and indeed behave ethically) if we attempt to learn something of the local language and 
customs. Then we have a better chance of understanding the people and circumstances 
we come across. What we learn from the experience may not be exactly how matters are 
understood within that country, but nevertheless can enhance our own experience, just 
as our encounters may enhance the experience of those we meet. 
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Figure 5: ‘New’ Heterodox view of economics: Structured pluralism 
Figure 5 attempts to illustrate this view of identifying schools of thought as a 
constructive measure, enabling rather than inhibiting the building up of knowledge 
(however defined). Orthodox economics is still shown as axiomatically structured, with 
a range of evolving theories. It is defined by a thick line, representing a positivist 
methodology, with a second line to indicate particularity of meaning. But these are both 
shown as hatched, to capture the influence of constructivism in encouraging an 
avoidance of being explicit about methodology, which introduces the possibility of 
some openness. Mathematical formalism is still taken to define economics, but without 
methodological justification, and with most decisions (about which techniques to use, 
and how) being tacit.  
Heterodox economics is defined in terms of a range of schools of thought (illustrated 
here by four schools). Structured pluralism is shown by double boundaries, which 
indicate that they are reasonably well-defined, although these definitions are provisional 
and partial. The purpose of defining the boundaries at a particular time is to aid 
communication; the process of changing these definitions as thought evolves itself is 
aided by having an initial set of definitions as a point of reference. Again there is 
overlap between the different heterodox schools of thought, and between some of these 
and orthodox economics. 
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5. Conclusion 
We have made the case here for schools of thought to make a constructive contribution 
to the practice of economics, and to critical debate. The (inevitable) failure of positivism 
has meant that a range of approaches can be sustained, where none can be demonstrated 
to be superior to the others. That range is limited by the practical requirement for 
knowledge to be developed within knowledge communities of a minimum size. Seen in 
this light, we can continue to move on from the old idea of schools of thought as 
citadels to be defended at all costs, to a more helpful view of schools of thought as an 
inevitable feature of the scientific landscape, ie as a means of organising knowledge. 
There remains however the strategic question. Knowledge communities function in 
an environment where power can be exercised. Far from the new fragmentation of 
orthodox economics opening up a new era of free competition between ideas (as 
suggested by Pencavel 1997), we continue to experience the exercise of market power 
by the socially-dominant orthodoxy. This power has now been given additional 
institutional form by such developments as the UK’s Research Assessment Exercise, 
which distorts research programmes and hiring decisions according to what is believed 
to be the likely judgement of the panel of peers (see further Gillies 2006). In such an 
environment, would it be better to downplay divisions within heterodox economics? 
Fragmentation as such need not be an issue, in that there is widespread recognition 
that there has been increasing fragmentation within orthodox economics, and this has 
been welcomed by many. Indeed heterodox economists are much better placed to 
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handle fragmentation among schools of thought, given the heightened awareness of 
methodological issues (relative to orthodox economists). The case has been made that 
using schools of thought as a means of classifying different approaches enables 
constructive criticism and more effective cross-fertilisation of ideas. It is, in contrast, 
unhelpful for it to be used as an inhibitor of communication. This applies to 
communication across the heterodox-orthodox divide as much as to communication 
across divides between heterodox schools of thought. The development of more fora for 
communication among heterodox economists using different approaches is thus most 
welcome, and there is no reason why that should not be extended to cover orthodox 
economics were there to be more awareness there of what is involved in communication 
across schools of thought.  
There is indeed a case, consistent with structured pluralism applied to a plurality of 
methodologies, for a methodology which is itself structured and pluralist. Specifically 
this would involve a range of methods. This itself can be applied to strategy for 
heterodox economics. As argued in more detail elsewhere (Dow 2000), heterodox 
economics can be promoted in a plurality of ways: developing theory within schools of 
thought, persuasion, criticism and learning across heterodox schools of thought, and 
persuasion, criticism and learning with respect to orthodox economics. There is no 
justification for a monist strategy, any more than a justification for a monist 
methodology of economics.  
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The usefulness of the concept of schools of thought therefore rests on how they are 
understood. As a set of defences they can no longer be justified. But as long as they are 
understood as an aid to learning and communication, they have a constructive role to 
play in the development and communication of heterodox economics in all its diversity. 
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i The precise details of these figures are of course highly contestable. The priority here is to suggest a 
framework within which detail can be debated. 
